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Sobol

LESSONS LEARNED FROM FERGUSON:
ENDING ABUSIVE COLLECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DEBT
Neil L. Sobol
“Addressing the deeply embedded constitutional
deficiencies we found demands an entire reorientation
of law enforcement in Ferguson. The City must replace
revenue-driven policing with a system grounded in the
principles of community policing and police
legitimacy, in which people are equally protected and
treated with compassion, regardless of race.”1
On March 4, 2015, Attorney General Eric Holder announced
the release of the Department of Justice’s “searing report” on the
Ferguson Police Department.2 The report was the product of one of
two federal investigations that occurred in response to a police
officer’s fatal shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager,
in August 2014.3 While the investigation of the officer concludes that
© 2015 Neil L. Sobol.
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1
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 6 (2015),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ferguson_findings_3-4-15.pdf
[hereinafter FPD REP.].
2
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Delivers Update on Investigation
in Ferguson, Missouri, JUSTICE.GOV (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-delivers-updateinvestigations-ferguson-missouri [hereinafter Holder Press Release].
3
Matt Apuzzo & John Eligon, Ferguson Police Tainted by Bias, Justice Department
Says, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/us/us-callson-ferguson-to-overhaul-criminal-justice-system.html; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO
THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE
OFFICER DARREN WILSON (2015),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf
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the “evidence does not support charging a violation of federal law,”4
the review of the police department paints a disturbing picture of
public officials more concerned with collecting revenue than
protecting public safety.5
Unfortunately, these allegations are neither limited to
Ferguson, a town of 21,000 people, nor are they recent developments
in the United States.6 As Eric Holder explained, “although the
concerns we are focused on . . . may be particularly acute in
Ferguson—they are not confined to any one city, state, or geographic
region. They implicate questions about fairness and trust that are
national in scope.”7 Change is necessary in Ferguson and other cities
to combat the abusive collection of the criminal justice debt.

[hereinafter BROWN REP.]; FPD REP., supra note 1.
4
BROWN REP., supra note 3, at 4.
5
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 2 (alleging that “Ferguson’s law enforcement practices
are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs”). The
Justice Department report is not the first criticism of Ferguson’s law enforcement
system. See, e.g., Tʜᴏᴍᴀs Hᴀʀᴠᴇʏ ET AL., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL
COURTS WHITE PAPER 2, 27, 31, 34 (2014), https://archive.org/details/pdfyiyuTY46j7R_fAvpK [hereinafter ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER] (reviewing the
municipal court practices in the Missouri cities of Bel-Ridge, Florissant, and
Ferguson); Class Action Complaint, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Complaint-Ferguson-Debtors-Prison-FILE-STAMPED.pdf.
6
See, e.g., Alex Bender et. al., Not Just a Ferguson Problem: How Traffic Courts
Drive Inequality in California, LCCR.COM 6 (2015), http://www.lccr.com/wpcontent/uploads/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-DriveInequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf [hereinafter CAL. REP.] (describing traffic fine
abuses in California); Ruth Marcus, Policing by Fleecing in Ferguson and Beyond,
WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-fergusonand-other-cities-jailed-for-being-poor/2015/03/06/e8cb5896-c42a-11e4-9271610273846239_story.html (asserting “[t]he most important thing to understand about
the problems with the police force in Ferguson, Mo., is that they’re not unique to
Ferguson”); Simon McCormack, The Ferguson Report was Damning, But It’s Not
Just a Ferguson Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2015, 4:19 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/09/ferguson-report_n_6833272.html
(describing “glaring racial disparities in minor arrest statistics” in Boston, Detroit,
Minneapolis, New York City, Newark, and Philadelphia); Editorial Board, Policing
for Profit Perverts Justice: Our View, USA Tᴏᴅᴀʏ (Mar. 11, 2015, 7:01 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/11/ferguson-mo-police-traffictickets-justice-department-editorials-debates/70175690/ (describing allegations of
policing for profit practices in Alabama, Mississippi, and Ohio).
7
Holder Press Release, supra note 2.
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This Article will address the collection issues by identifying
the key findings in the Department of Justice’s report and discussing
the major points to be learned from the allegations in Ferguson. The
lessons learned from Ferguson should be a guide to other
municipalities that are or may be on the brink of developing similar
abusive collection practices.8
I.

THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S INVESTIGATION

The report on the Ferguson Police Department has been
characterized as a “scathing” indictment of city officials, the court
system, and the police in their relentless pursuit of revenue collection
leading to violations of federal constitutional and statutory law.9 This
section of the Article will briefly describe the background and
methodology of the report as well as its primary findings.
A. Background & Methodology
The pattern-or-practice provisions of the Violent Crime
8

In an introduction to a paperback version of the report, Theodore Shaw, Director of
the Center for Civil Rights at the University of North Carolina School of Law, urges
all Americans to read the report as a starting point to “begin the process of turning
the tragedy of Ferguson into a turning point for our country.” Tʜᴇᴏᴅᴏʀᴇ M. Sʜᴀᴡ,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INTRODUCTION To THE FERGUSON
REPORT xvi (2015). After months of negotiations, the Department of Justice and the
City of Ferguson were unable to reach an agreement to resolve the concerns in the
Ferguson report, and the Department filed a complaint against Ferguson. Matt
Apuzzo, Department of Justice Sues Ferguson, Which Reversed Course on
Agreement, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/justice-department-sues-fergusonover-police-deal.html; Complaint, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv00180 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 10, 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pacerdocuments/99/144595/10716541447.pdf. This article was submitted prior to the
lawsuit and does not specifically address the allegations in the complaint; however,
the allegations are similar to the findings and conclusions made in the Ferguson
report.
9
Mark Berman & Wesley Lowrey, The 12 Key Highlights From the DOJ’s Scathing
Ferguson Report, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/03/04/the-12-keyhighlights-from-the-dojs-scathing-ferguson-report/; Trymaine Lee, Justice
Department Releases Scathing Ferguson Report, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 3, 2015, 9:17
PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/justice-department-releases-scathing-fergusonreport; FPD REP., supra note 1, at 1.
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Control and Law Enforcement Act,10 the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act,11 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act12 authorized
the report on the Ferguson Police Department.13 The investigation
was not limited in scope or review to the operations or personnel of
the police department; it also examined the role of city and court
officials.14 A brief introduction to the city’s demographics and its
governance policies is important to understanding the report.
Ferguson is one of nearly ninety cities located within St. Louis
County, Missouri.15 The city consists of approximately 21,000
citizens, of whom sixty-seven percent are African American and
twenty-nine percent are Caucasian.16 One-quarter of Ferguson’s
residents have incomes below the federal poverty level.17
An elected mayor and a six-person council govern the city.18
A city manager appointed by the council serves as the chief executive
and administrative officer and supervises the city’s departments,
including the police department.19 The city manager also appoints the
police chief.20
The municipal court is physically and operationally under the
supervision of the police chief.21 The court is housed within the police
department, and the court staff report to the police chief.22 Unlike the
court staff, the municipal judge is not subject to the police chief’s
supervision. The judge, nominated by the city manager and elected by
the council, is under state court rules generally subject to oversight by
the St. Louis County Circuit Court; however, the municipal code gives
the judge broad powers and discretion to establish the court’s practices
10

42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 3789d (2006).
12
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
13
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 1.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 6 (citing data from the U.S. Census Bureau).
16
Id. (citing data from the U.S. Census Bureau).
17
Id. (citing data from the U.S. Census Bureau).
18
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 7.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 8.
22
Id. at 8.
11

Sobol

2015]

LESSONS LEARNED FROM FERGUSON

297

and procedures.23
The Department of Justice’s report was based primarily on
interviews, ride-alongs with officers, courtroom observations, reviews
of third-party studies, police records, incident reports, emails, and
information submitted by police and court officials.24
The
investigators interviewed the top city, court, and police officials,
including the mayor, the city manager, the finance director, the judge,
the court clerk, and the police chief. Additionally, they questioned
half of the police officers as well as hundreds of city residents who
had contact with the police. The investigators also spoke with
community and advocacy groups.25
B. Findings & Conclusions
The six-month Ferguson investigation found three major
problems: a misplaced focus on collection, racial bias, and a
community’s distrust in the criminal justice system.26
1. Revenue Maximization as the Primary Goal
The report concludes that Ferguson’s focus on revenue
collection adversely affected its law enforcement process to the
detriment of its citizens.27 The investigators found that the overemphasis on revenue collection was a policy that pervaded
governmental, judicial, and policing powers as “[c]ity, police, and
court officials for years [had] worked in concert to maximize revenue
at every stage of the enforcement process.”28
City officials stressed the importance of revenue maximization
in the municipality’s monitoring of collections, as well as its
communications with police and court officials. The city’s estimated
and actual revenues collected reflect a significant and increasing
reliance on fines and fees from enforcement of municipal code
23

Id. (citing FERGUSON, MO., MUN. CODE § 13-29)
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 1.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 2.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 10.
24
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violations.29 Actual fines and fees collected between the fiscal years
2010 and 2013 increased each year with $1.38 million collected in
2010 and $2.46 million collected in 2013. Budgeted amounts for
fiscal years 2014 and 2015 were $2.63 million and $3.09 million,
respectively. The $1.38 million collected in 2010 represented about
12.5% of the general revenues for 2010, while the $3.09 million
budgeted in 2015 represents over 23% of the budgeted general
revenues for 2015.30
To help reach the budgeted revenue increases, city officials
regularly monitored revenue collection efforts by the courts and the
police, approved high fines, and encouraged aggressive collection
efforts.31 Law enforcement reports provided to the city focused on
revenue generation, such as tickets issued, rather than public safety
concerns.32 Moreover, the investigation found that city officials even
directed enforcement plans to “fill the revenue pipeline,”33 and tried to
maximize revenue within the state-imposed limit on revenues from
fines.34 Communications to court and police officials praised efforts
that continually increased collection amounts.35
The city’s focus on revenue collection, in turn, created pressure
on officers to maximize revenue. Officer productivity, promotion,
evaluation, and discipline were based on the number of arrests and
citations.36 Lists displayed in the police station reflected the monthly
arrest statistics for each officer. Officers were encouraged to write
multiple citations at every stop, with bragging rights going to those
who had the most citations during a single stop.37
Similarly, the report found that the city’s revenue
maximization goals “fundamentally compromise[d] the role of
29

Id. at 9.
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 9–10.
31
Id. at 12–13.
32
Id. at 11.
33
Id. at 13 (quoting Ferguson’s Financial Director).
34
Id. at 14.
35
Id. at 13.
36
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 11–12.
37
Id. at 11 (finding that “[i]ssuing three or four charges in one stop is not
uncommon” and that “[o]fficers sometimes write six, eight, or in at least one
instance, fourteen citations for a single encounter”).
30
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Ferguson’s municipal court.”38 The city’s finance director, the police
chief, and the court clerk had a role in setting the revenue goals for
fines and fees. Court staff and the judge recognized the city’s focus on
obtaining these goals.39 Preset fines in Ferguson were typically “‘at or
near the top of the list’ compared with other [Missouri]
municipalities.”40 For non-preset fines, the report identified particular
cases of high fines, including charges of over $300 for a manner of
walking violation and over $500 for high grass and weeds.41
The finance director praised the judge for increasing court
collections and creating additional fees.42 When the city council was
considering reappointment of the judge, and concerns were raised
about whether he was handling cases “properly and fairly,” the city
manager, commented “[i]t goes without saying the [c]ity cannot afford
to lose any efficiency in our [c]ourts, nor experience any decrease in
our [f]ines and [f]orfeitures.”43
As support for its claim that the court focused more on revenue
production than public safety, the report highlighted the court’s use of
arrest warrants and additional fees for failure to appear or make
payments.44 This practice produced “overwhelming evidence of minor
municipal code violations resulting in multiple arrests, jail time, and
payments that exceed[ed] the cost of the original ticket many times
over.”45 Accordingly, while penalties for underlying violations were
typically limited to fines, defendants were often arrested and
incarcerated based on failure to pay the fines.46
38

Id. at 3.
Id. at 14.
40
Id. at 52.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 14. Notably, the additional fees included “many of which are widely
considered abusive and may be unlawful, including several that the City has repealed
during the pendency of [the Department of Justice’s] investigation.” Id.
43
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 15.
44
Id. at 42. Notably, after the investigation started, Ferguson ended its practice of
imposing Failure to Appear charges. Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 42. For a more detailed discussion of use of arrest and incarceration as a
method of collecting criminal justice debt, see Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor:
Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486 (2016),
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701&context
=mlr.
39
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Overall, the report found that instead of “act[ing] as a neutral
arbiter of the law . . . the court primarily use[d] its judicial authority as
the means to compel the payment of fines and fees that advance[d] the
[c]ity’s financial interests.”47
2. Racial Bias
Ferguson’s focus on the collection of revenue reportedly
“reflects and exacerbates existing racial bias, including racial
stereotypes.”48 The investigation concluded that African Americans
received disparate treatment at virtually every phase of the law
enforcement process, and such treatment included intentional
discrimination in violation of equal protection rights under the
Constitution.49
While approximately two-thirds of Ferguson’s
residents are African American, the following statistics reflect the
disparate treatment by the police and the court system and portray a
“comprehensive municipal justice system that, at each juncture,
enforces the law more harshly against black people than others:”50
● African Americans were subject to eighty-five percent of
traffic stops, eighty-eight percent of the reported cases
involving police use of force, ninety percent of citations, and
ninety-three percent of arrests.51
● African Americans were twice as likely to be cited and more
than twice as likely to be arrested and searched following a
traffic stop, even though contraband was twenty-six percent
less likely to be found with African Americans.52
47

FPD REP., supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 2. A detailed analysis of Ferguson’s racial bias and segregation issues is
beyond the scope of this Article. For more information, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN,
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THE MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE
ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014), http://s3.epi.org/files/2014/making-of-fergusonfinal.pdf. Additionally, for a detailed discussion of the role that race plays in police
stops, see CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD HAIDERMARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014).
49
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 62.
50
Id. at 63.
51
Id. at 62.
52
Id.
48
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● African Americans were “more likely to receive multiple
citations during a single incident.”53
● African Americans received a disproportionate amount of
charges for petty offenses, including over ninety-percent of
charges for manner of walking in a roadway, failure to comply,
resisting arrest, and disturbing the peace.54
● African Americans were sixty-eight percent less likely to have
their cases dismissed, received ninety-two percent of the arrest
warrants issued, and represented ninety-six percent of those
arrested solely because of an outstanding municipal warrant.55
The report determined that “this disproportionate burden on
African Americans cannot be explained by any difference in the rate at
which people of different races violate the law.”56 Instead, the
Department of Justice concluded that the disparate treatment was due
in part to unlawful bias and racial stereotypes and found “substantial
evidence of racial bias among police and court staff.”57 The evidence
included the racial disparities in police and court actions, the historical
opposition to African Americans in Ferguson, and racial stereotypes
reflected in communications by police and court personnel.58
Additionally, the composition of the police force and the court
personnel do not reflect the diversity in Ferguson. The report found
that only four of Ferguson’s fifty-four sworn police officers were
African American.59 Similarly, at the time of the report, the judge, the
prosecuting attorney, and the clerks in the municipal court were
53

Id.
Id. at 62. A manner of walking violation can occur if an individual “walk[s] along
and upon an adjacent roadway” rather than the sidewalk. FERGUSON, MO., MUN.
CODE § 44-344 (2015).
55
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 62–63.
56
Id. at 5.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 63. The report identified specific messages sent by court and police
personnel, including supervisors, using their city email accounts that reflected racial
bias. Id. at 72. Typically, the messages were forwarded and senders were not
disciplined. Id.
59
Id. at 7.
54
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white.60
3. Distrust
Ferguson’s persistent focus on revenue collection and the
disparate treatment of African Americans created distrust in the police
and judicial system, which existed “long before Michael Brown’s
shooting death in August 2014.”61 Instead, the report found that the
distrust was primarily due to the “years of unlawful and unfair law
enforcement practices by” the police and court system. 62 The report
referred to research confirming the findings in Ferguson that “when
police and courts treat people unfairly, unlawfully, or disrespectfully,
law enforcement loses legitimacy in the eyes of those who have
experienced, or even observed, the unjust conduct.”63 The lack of
trust, in turn, makes it unlikely that citizens will “seek police
assistance even when they are victims of crime, or that they will
cooperate with the police to solve or prevent other crimes.”64
Ferguson’s failure to have a system for effectively reporting
and dealing with citizens’ complaints about the police contributed to
the lack of trust issue.65 The report found that the department’s
“tolerance for officer misconduct” when viewed in relation to the
“aggressive enforcement of even minor municipal infractions”
supported the statement “that a ‘different set of rules’ applies to
Ferguson’s police than to its African-American residents, and that
making a complaint about officer misconduct is futile.”66
Moreover, the failure to develop community policing or
60

Id. at 8. Additionally, at the time of the shooting of Michael Brown, only one of
the six council members were African American, and the police chief and mayor
where white. Matt Pearce, Maya Srikrishnan & David Zucchino, Protesters and
Police Face Off in St. Louis Suburb Over Shooting, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2014,
10:19 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-missouri-st-louispolice-shooting-teen-20140811-story.html#page=1.
61
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 79.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 80 (citing TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002)).
64
Id. at 81.
65
Id. at 82–86.
66
FPD REP., supra note 1, at 82.
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engagement strategies only exacerbated the preexisting trust issues.67
As revenue-maximization practices increased, community-policing
efforts decreased and “dwindled to almost nothing in recent years.”68
Ferguson has only one officer assigned to community relations.
Moreover, the department’s focus on the importance of ticket writing
and use of twelve-hour shifts to generate increased revenue has
reportedly adversely affected community relations.69

II.

MOVING FORWARD

Revenue maximization, racial bias, and community distrust
have created a system in Ferguson that improperly disregards the
rights of individuals. The Department of Justice’s report recognizing
that resolving the issues in Ferguson will require “a fundamental
redirection of Ferguson’s approach to law enforcement” suggests
reforms in both the police department and the court system.70 Change
has begun, as following the release of the report, the mayor, city
manager, police chief, municipal judge, court clerk, and other court
personnel have either resigned or been dismissed.71 This section will
build on the broad recommendations in the report and evaluate some
of the steps that have already been taken.
A. Focus on Protecting and Serving Rather than Collecting
Revenue
Instead of viewing the police and the court system as primarily
a funding source, municipalities must recognize the importance of
67

Id. at 86–88.
Id. at 87.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 90.
71
Christine Byers & Stephen Deere, A Look Into Ferguson's Pricey Pick To
Negotiate DOJ Settlement, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 3, 2015, 5:05 AM),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/a-look-into-ferguson-s-priceypick-to-negotiate-doj/article_05a6800b-e525-5392-94eb-cbf7b68a1830.html
(describing the release of employees based on racist emails and the resignations of
the city manager, police chief, and municipal judge); Wesley Lowery & Sari
Horwitz, Ferguson Police Chief Tom Jackson Resigns Following Scathing DOJ
Report, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/03/11/ferguson-police-tom-jackson-resigns-following-scathing-dojreport/.
68
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providing justice and protection for its citizens. The system should reexamine the setting and assessment of fees and fines, remove revenue
collection as the primary means for evaluating police officers and
court personnel, take into account ability to pay criminal justice debt,
and use payment alternatives when appropriate.72
Notably, on July 9, 2015, Missouri’s Governor Jay Nixon
signed a reform bill, aimed at ending many of the practices criticized
in the report on Ferguson.73 The bill, touted by Nixon as “’the most
sweeping’ municipal court reform bill in state history,” addresses
uncontrolled revenue generation, excessive monetary charges, and the
use of incarceration for minor traffic violations.74
Specifically, the legislation establishes caps for the percentage
of a municipality’s annual operating revenue attributed to fines and
charges for minor traffic violations. In 2016, the cap will be 12.5% for
municipalities in counties with more than 950,000 residents and 20%
for municipalities in counties with populations less than 950,000.75
Furthermore, fines and court costs for any minor traffic violation are
limited to $300, and costs shall not be assessed if a defendant is
determined to be indigent.76 The reform permits incarceration for
minor traffic violations only if they involve “alcohol or controlled
substances . . . endangering health or welfare of others, [or] eluding or
giving false information to a law enforcement officer.”77 Additionally,
municipalities must establish procedures for determining indigency of
defendants and use the information in setting fines, costs, and
payments options.78 Cities must certify that they do not assess failure
to appear charges for minor traffic violations, and that they use
72

FPD REP., supra note 1, at 90–98.
Robert Patrick & Stephen Deere, 'Sweeping' Court Reform Comes As Nixon Signs
Bill To Cap Cities' Revenue, End Predatory Habits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July
10, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/sweeping-court-reform-comes-as-nixon-signs-bill-to-cap/article_cafffb7eb24d-5292-b7bb-84ef81c6e81d.html.
74
Id.
75
MO. ANN. STAT. § 479.359.2 (West 2015).
76
Id. §§ 479.353(1), (4). The Missouri Supreme Court is directed to create model
rules to help courts establish standards for determining indigency. Id.
77
Id. § 479.353(2).
78
Id. § 479.360.1(4). A Missouri Supreme Court order effective July 1, 2015,
requires courts to provide additional time or installment plans to defendants unable
to pay fines. MO. R. ORD. & TRAF. VIOL. R. 37.65 (2014).
73
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“alternative payment plans and community service alternatives.”79
For enforcement purposes, the statute establishes minimum
standards that require annual audits, adequate insurance, publication of
ordinances, certification or accreditation of police departments, and
written policies regarding use of force and reporting of crime and
police stop data.80 Additionally, it sets up a procedure for residents to
allege that municipalities have failed to meet the standards and
establishes remedies for failure to meet the standards.81 Municipalities
that fail to comply with the requirements risk transfer of court cases,
“loss of sales tax revenue[,] and disincorporation.”82
The reform is a good start; however, it is limited to cases
involving minor traffic violations. Merely placing caps on minor
traffic violations may not resolve the revenue maximization or racial
bias issues as it leaves open the potential for cities to create revenue by
increasing collection of fines for non-traffic violations.83 Non-traffic
citations, such as loitering, sagging pants, high grass, peeling paint,
and jaywalking,84 accounted for more than fifty-percent of the
citations in Ferguson.85 African Americans received ninety-five
percent of the “manner of walking” in a roadway citations issued in
Ferguson.86 As one commentator calculated, African Americans were
over nine times more likely to be cited for “manner of walking.” 87 A
79
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Jennifer S. Mann, Municipalities Ticket for Trees and Toys, As Traffic Revenue
Declines, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 24, 2015, 12:15 PM),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/municipalities-ticket-fortrees-and-toys-as-traffic-revenue-declines/article_42739be7-afd1-5f66-b325e1f654ba9625.html.
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1, at 7, 69 n.46.
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Mann, supra note 83.
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manner of walking charge was Officer Darren Wilson’s initial
allegation against Michael Brown and was the charge used against
protesters following the fatal shooting of Brown.88
Fees and fines should be rationally related to the offense
charged and should not be used merely to raise revenue.89 To reduce
conflict of interest concerns, Professors Wayne Logan and Ronald
Wright suggest the adoption of independent commissions to examine
the appropriateness of current and proposed monetary sanctions.90 A
recent draft of the Model Penal Code (Second) of Sentencing abolishes
all costs and fees on the basis that their collection creates conflicts of
interest and does not fulfill the goals of sentencing.91 Moreover, the
Model Penal Code draft broadens ability to pay determinations by
precluding any monetary sanctions that would leave defendants
without “sufficient means for reasonable living expenses and family

88
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(Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.policeone.com/chiefs-sheriffs/articles/8396631-The-5big-lessons-from-DOJs-Ferguson-report (noting “[i]f enforcement of the law is
designed around funds rather than as a means to create conformance with the law for
the purpose of health and safety, the justification for policing become suspect”).
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Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1175, 1215–17, http://www.illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilrcontent/articles/2014/4/Wright.pdf.
91
See Kevin R. Reitz, The Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommendations
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MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04D(2), Alternative § 6.04D(1) (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2014), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/Reitz_5fmt_PDF1.pdf. Professor Reitz also discusses an
alternative, although less “preferred” provision that instead of abolishing fees would
condition their use on a “host of substantive and procedural limitations.” Id.
Professor R. Barry Ruback agrees with banning the assessment of fees (including
costs). R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions:
Considering the Victim, the Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1820
(2015), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/Ruback_5fmt_PDF.pdf. Professors Katherine Beckett and
Alexes Harris recommend that both fines as well as fees should be abolished.
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obligations.”92
B. Remove Racial Bias
Hopefully, removing the focus on revenue-based policing will
eliminate some of the racial bias complaints; however, as the report
revealed, racial bias was due to other more insidious issues in the city,
including intentional discrimination.
Training, supervision,
accountability, and diversity are essential to addressing racial biases.
Training needs to reflect the racial concerns, conduct standards should
be established, and police and court officials should be held
accountable and subject to discipline for failure to meet the
standards.93 Data should be continually collected and evaluated to
help track the efforts at reducing racial disparities.94 Incentives should
be created to encourage such reductions.95 Additionally, diversity
must be a focus in recruiting, hiring, and promotion to help establish a
municipal system that is more reflective of the community.96
C. Restore Trust
Resolving the problems of reliance on revenue generation and
racial bias are important, but ultimately, the distrust created by the
system must also be addressed. The Department of Justice has
emphasized that “if the Ferguson Police Department truly commits to
community policing, it can restore the trust that it has lost.”97
Improved community engagement is necessary so that “law
enforcement is seen as part of, rather than distant from, the
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communities they serve.”98
Better community engagement requires not only that law
enforcement is positively involved in the community but also that the
community participates in the law enforcement process.99 Instead of
reducing community involvement and leaving only one officer
engaged in community relations, positive community engagement
should be a priority. Officers must take an active role in helping and
participating in the community. Officers should be evaluated on
positive community involvement, rather than on the number of tickets
that they write.100 Additionally, the community must have an
opportunity to review the law enforcement process. Citizen oversight
groups should be established. Procedures for dealing with complaints
about law enforcement need to be set up, and transparency be afforded
to the public.101 The shooting of Michael Brown has prompted
widespread calls for the use of body cameras by police, and Jim
Bueermann, president of the Police Foundation in Washington,
predicts that “[w]ithin the next five years or so, body-worn cameras
will be as ubiquitous in the world of policing as handcuffs, the police
radio, and gun.”102 A more controversial remedy to help restore
community relations is the use of police residency requirements.103
98
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Removing racial bias and changing the focus of law
enforcement to protecting and serving rather than collecting revenue
should help with the community’s acceptance of law enforcement. As
Professor Tom R. Tyler, who has written extensively on creating
community trust in the legal system, has stated:
[S]tudies consistently show that the most important issue to
public evaluations of the police is whether they believe that
the police are exercising their authority fairly. This means
that they are not making decisions about who to stop based
upon race; that they are willing to listen to people when
they stop them; apply the law consistently and without
prejudice and take time to explain the reasons for their
actions. Most importantly, the police need to treat people
in the community respectfully and with courtesy. When the
police do these things they build trust. In other words, we
know how the police can build trust in communities, White
or minority. If people see the police acting with justice,
they respond with trust.104
CONCLUSION
The allegations in Ferguson are shocking and distressing,
especially given the comments that they are not limited to this one
city. Efforts must now focus on resolving the issues in Ferguson and
elsewhere, rather than merely continued criticism. Municipalities owe
an obligation to protect and serve their residents rather than treat them
as sources of revenue.
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